I evaluate the role of China's privatization of the economy in weakening the effects of the birth control policy, known as the one-child policy in the West, during the last three decades. State-owned enterprises or other state-owned organizations (SOEs) imposes more control over individual choices and hence represents increased state capacity (Acemoglu et al., 2015) . The baseline OLS regressions show that compared to those not working in a SOE, the number of children for individuals working in a SOE is 0.1 lower on average. In other words, if the individuals not working in SOEs came to SOEs, we would probably lose 10 children for each one hundred of them. To deal with the selection issue, I use father's SOE status as an instrumental variable. The 2SLS results show a much larger difference in the number of children: 0.4. The existence of positive selection and the reduction in bias from job type switches probably rationalize the larger 2SLS results. Furthermore, Probit regressions give a strong negative impact of working in SOEs on the probability to have more than one child. These results imply that the birth control policy might already lead to an even lower fertility rate in China without privatization. * I am indebted to Daniel S. Hamermesh, Kishore Gawande and Michael Geruso for their guidance and support. I am also grateful to
Introduction
China's birth control policy, known as the one-child policy in the West, is perhaps a policy affecting the largest number of births in history. China's national fertility dropped below the replacement level in early 1990s and continues its downward trend ever since, with a total fertility rate (TFR) at about 1.7 births per woman in 2012 according to the World Bank 1 . The 2000 census gave a lower TFR of 1.22 and the 2010 census reported a TFR of 1.18, which are only one half of the world average. Although there is a disagreement over how much each factor contributes, a consensus is that both the birth control policy and socioeconomic changes lead to such a sharp decline in fertility. The importance of China's fertility comes not only from its sheer population size, one-fifth of world population, but also from the integration of this country into the global economic system. As the "world factory" and the largest exporter in the world, China provides cheap products to global consumers and keeps a low inflation around the world, so that China's demographic change will affect the global economy profoundly. Furthermore, the declining fertility rate combined with population aging implies a sharply increasing dependency ratio of population in near future, which in turn will threaten the social welfare system in this country.
In this paper, I argue that there is another economic force that already weakens the effects of the birth control policy and slows down the fertility decline, which has not yet been discussed by the previous literature. State-owned enterprises and other state-owned organizations (hereafter referred to as the SOEs), imply more control over individual choices by the government. Motivated by this reasoning, I investigate if an individual working in a SOE will have less children than his counterparts working in a non-SOE. Calculated based on China Labour Statistical Yearbooks, as of 1978, there were about 78% of urban labor working in SOEs 2 . The share of urban labor in SOEs declined to 18% in 2010 3 . Although there was a large change in the composition of urban labor because of the inflow of rural migrant workers, the share of urban labor in SOEs still decreased sharply excluding rural migrant workers.
Using a novel repeated cross-sectional data set, I find a strong and economically meaningful effect of working in a SOE on the fertility rate, in linear regressions, 2SLS regressions using father's SOE status as an instrumental variable, Probit and IV Probit regressions. This implies that the previous research probably underevaluate the potential impacts of the birth control policy. Without privatization of the economy during the last three decades, we would probably see an even lower fertility rate in China. Since SOEs already take up a much smaller share of the total employment than three decades ago and their control over individual choices are also weakened than before, the potential of privatization in slowing down the decline in fertility is limited. These facts suggest a strong policy implication: given a low fertility rate in China, a further relaxation or abolition of the birth control policy is needed.
The goal of this paper is to make progress on understanding the role of the government and economic system in affecting the fertility rate by providing evidence for the hypothesis that the government control over economy can directly affect citizens' fertility decisions. The SOEs can be seen as increased state capacity (Acemoglu et al., 2015) , the ability of the government to enforce its policies, over their employees. Acemoglu et al. (2015) document positive impacts of such state capacity on Columbia's local economic growth and educational attainment. In my paper, I focus on the impacts of state capacity on family decisions. Although order is perhaps more important in Columbia because of long-term military conflicts, the strong state capacity in China is not necessarily always productive, and hence the weakening control of the government over citizens should be more likely to have positive effects.
In the major parts, I keep the male sample with urban residence certificate ("Hukou") age 18-60, married or once married. The males are usually the primary earner in a family and hence the job type should have a larger impact on them, though most of the results for the female sample are qualitatively identical. In China, there are differential family planning policies toward rural residents and urban residents based on residence certificate. In general, rural residents are allowed to have a second child if the first one is a girl, which is partly attributed to the agricultural production need for male labor. However, the official one-child restriction is quite rigid and uniform among the citizens with urban residence certificate, especially those in the same province. That is, although plenty of rural migrant workers work in urban areas, they are not restricted by the stricter control over fertility since they usually do not have urban residence certificate. The baseline OLS regressions show that compared to those not working in a SOE, the number of children for individuals working in a SOE is about 0.1 lower on average. In other words, if the individuals not working in SOEs came to SOEs, we would probably lose 10 children for each one hundred of them.
Several thorny issues might prevent effective identification if left unsolved. First, I can obtain the number of all children an individual has rather than the number of children living with the individual, as that contained in many other datasets. Secondly, a worker might switch from a SOE job to a non-SOE job or do the converse. Resulting from the SOE and non-SOE segmentation in China (Knight and Yueh, 2009; Wang et al., 2014) , the number of job type switches is not large; especially, in Section 3.2 I explain why these job type switches lead to the underestimation bias and how my IV strategy using father's SOE status as an instrumental variable reduces this bias. Thirdly, SOE workers and non-SOE workers are not the same, that is, there is a selection issue. For example, it is possible that people with a weaker preference toward children or a higher ability to raise children are more likely to work in SOEs, so that the selection might be positive or negative. I find that positive selection seems more important, and my IV strategy also solves this selection issue. I provide extensive historical evidence and empirical evidence from regressions to support the use of this instrumental variable.
Besides the usual reasons for using father's characteristics, my practice is based on a special institutional feature in China, which leads to a strong impact of father's job type on their children's. For a long period till the late 1990s, children were usually allowed to take their parents' jobs in SOEs one-by-one (Dingzhi). For example, if both of the parents are working in SOEs and they have two children, then both of the children can enter the same firms upon their parents' retirement or early retirement. In addition, the exclusion constraint is plausibly satisfied because in general the group of fathers spent most of their career during the planned economy era and had little freedom to choose their jobs, and there is not evidence showing that the government distributed SOE jobs to groups with certain preference toward children. The 2SLS results show that compared to those not working in a SOE, the number of children for individuals working in a SOE is 0.4 lower on average. Finally, in regressions with a dummy variable for one child or more than one child as the dependent variable, I also find a strong negative impact of working in SOEs on the probability to have more than one child.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides an introduction to the historical background of the birth control policy and a review of the related literature. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy; Section 4 describes the dataset; Section 5 and Section 6 demonstrates the results and robustness check. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
Background and Literature Review

Background
Although the declining fertility trend in China is broadly consistent with the experiences of developed countries and newly industrialized countries accompanied by economic development, it is also widely considered as a special case related to government intervention. Beginning in the early 1970s, the government initiated its "Wan, Xi, Shao"(later, longer, fewer) policy. And in 1979, grounded in a neo-Malthusian concern over the negative effects of a large population size on economic growth, the government launched the much radical and controversial one-child policy. Supported by a well-established bureaucracy devoted to routine surveillance and policy enforcement, the policy penetrates Chinese society from the highest level of the government down to urban neighborhoods and rural villages. Even with its later adjustments and modifications, the draconian "one-child per couple" rule applies to nearly two-thirds of Chinese couples till recently (Gu et al., 2007) .
The birth control policy is nationwide, however, provinces have some autonomy in implementing this policy (Cai, 2010) . Beginning in 1987, official policy granted local officials the flexibility to make exceptions and allow a second children in the case of "practical difficulties" such as cases in which the father is a disabled serviceman, and some provinces had other exemptions worked into their policies as well. Families with children with disability face different policies and families whose first child suffers from physical disability, mental illness, or intellectual disability are allowed to have more children. The number of people in these groups is very small and should not drive a statistically significant result in my sample.
Starting from 1984, in most rural areas, families are allowed to apply to have a second child if their first-born is a daughter, which is partly attributed to the importance of male labor in agricultural production. Notice that the differential policies toward rural residents and urban residents are based on residence certificate. That is, although plenty of rural migrant workers work in urban areas, they are not restricted by the stricter control over fertility in urban areas since they usually do not have urban residence certificate. Because of this institutional difference and the fact there exist very few SOEs in rural areas 4 , I will not include the individuals with rural residence certificate.
Furthermore, starting from the late 1990s, the majority of provinces and cities permit two parents who were "only children" themselves to have two children. In 2013, this rule was relaxed further: couples in which one parent is an only child are allowed to have a second child 5 . These policies are relatively new and thus have no impact on most individuals in my sample. Moreover, it is rare to see both couples are the only child themselves. In addition, since people working in SOEs are more likely to be the only child (as found in my paper) and can enjoy the relatively relaxed policies, my estimates are probably conservative. Finally, ethnic minority groups face relatively relaxed restrictions. I will control the dummy variable for ethnic Han or not to account for this impact. A more comprehensive introduction to the birth control policy can be seen in Fong (2006) .
Usually, a job in SOEs is more attractive than most other jobs. It usually means a high level of job security, better retirement benefits even if the regular wage level is not always higher than that in many non-SOEs, such as foreign invested firms, especially before the large-scale SOE reform in the late 1990s. And importantly, a SOE is much more likely to grant the local urban residence certificate, which is related to many kinds of valuable social welfare, such as better health care access and better education for their children. These facts mean that many people probably tolerate the stricter restrictions on their fertility decisions. The benefits from working in a SOE increases the opportunity cost of an extra child, and hence lead to a smaller number of children in the framework of Becker (1960) . Although there is not a nationwide official law stating the stronger restrictions in SOEs, in order to implement the one-child policy, a SOE can effectively threat its workers in terms of reduced wage, fringe benefits and promotion opportunities, and even fire them. The promotion of SOE managers is directly related to the effectiveness of the one-child policy in their territory, hence it is not surprising that many of them have a strong incentive to enforce this policy.
Extensive media coverage provides stories about the impacts of working in a SOE on fertility decision. A recent report by the Beijing Youth Daily quotes a local official in Hunan province in National Health and Family Planning Commission (NHFPC), "Most urban families desiring two children already evaded the birth control through the one and a half child policy or just gave birth to more children. The main affected group by the one-child policy is those working in state-owned enterprises or other state-owned organization" 6 . Another news covered by Chongqing Evening News covered a story that a public school teacher was fired and forced to pay a penalty, called the social maintenance fee, of 50 thousand yuan, more than threefold of the per capita disposable income in urban Chongqing 7 . In contrast to these, it is rarely seen a worker in a private firm is fired because of an additional birth, not to mention those selfemployed. However, to the best of my knowledge, there is not a study directly approaching the role of privatization in weakening the birth control policy, probably resulting from the thorny issues mentioned in the introduction. My paper will fill this blank.
Related Literature
The SOEs can be seen as increased state capacity (Acemoglu et al., 2015) , the ability of the government to enforce its policies, over their employees, and hence my paper extends Acemoglu et al. (2015) 's discussion into the impacts of state capacity on family decisions. State capacity is linked to the "East Asian Miracle" (Johnson, 1982; Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; Evans, 1995) and the economic failure of African or Latin American nations (Herbst, Broadly, my paper is related to three strands of literature. The first is the literature about the impacts of privatization in transitional economies. Starting from the 1980s, Soviet Union, Eastern European countries, China, India and many other countries experience a transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy, with a push to privatize state-owned enterprises and resources, and a blossom of newly established private enterprises. A huge literature documents that privatization improves corporate performance (Frydman et al., 1999) , increases bank efficiency (Bonin et al., 2005) and wage level (Brainerd, 2002) , discusses the relationship between methods of privatization and economic growth (Bennett et al., 2007) . LastarriaCornhiel (1997) explores the transformation of customary tenure systems and their impact on women's rights to land in Africa. Estrin et al. (2009) summarize the studies on the effects of privatization and ownership in transition economies.
However, in former communist countries, to a less extent in many developing countries, SOEs are not only used by the government to control economic resources, but also are an effective instrument to impose restrictions on individual choices. During the New Economic Policy period (early 1920s) in Russia and the early communist period in China (early 1950s), a vivid private economy existed but was soon taken over by the governments. If the government just taxed the private enterprises, it might already achieve a high economic growth and obtain enough tax revenue like what happens in the United States, rather than tolerated a long-term stagflation. This implies that economic performance is probably not the main concern for these governments. In fact, in Mao's China (1950s to 1970s), a couple needed to get approved by the organizations they worked before marrying. Till now, although the share of SOEs in the national production and employment is much lower than three decades ago, they still dominate in most profitable industries and usually pay a higher wage and fringe benefits to their employees com-pared to most private firms, besides more job security. This compensation means that at least a share of individuals would like to tolerate more restrictions on their individual choices including fertility decisions, a rational choice based on the cost-benefit analysis. My paper deepens the understanding on the effects of the government control through SOEs and its relaxation.
This study also adds to the literature about the determination of fertility in China. The Chinese government 8 , quoting Zhenwu Zhai, director of Renmin University's School of Sociology and Population in Beijing, estimates that 400 million births were prevented by the onechild policy as of 2011. This estimate probably underevaluates the impacts of socioeconomic changes. Several studies have demonstrated that fertility variation in China at the provincial level is closely related to variations in economic and social development (e.g., Poston and Gu 1987; Poston 2000; Chen et al. 2009; Cai, 2010) . A long-term experiment in a county in Shanxi Province where the family planning law was suspended, suggests that families would not have many more children even if the law were abolished. The problem is that this experiment is limited to just a county, and hence it is not clear the nationwide impacts would be. However, while almost all these research attempt to find the reasons of a fertility decline, my paper provide a mechanism in slowing down the decline. That is, many previous studies may underevaluate the potential impacts of the birth control policy.
Furthermore, my paper is also related to the literature on the causes of the dramatic demographic and social changes of the late 1960s and 1970s in the U.S. ("power of the pill" or "power of abortion"). Goldin and Katz (2002) use a differences-in-differences specification to provide evidence that female college graduates who legally could consent to the pill prior to age 18 married later and were more likely to pursue graduate education. Subsequent work has extended this framework to produce additional evidence on the "power of the pill" in causing reduced fertility (Bailey, 2006 (Bailey, , 2009 Ananat and Hungerman, 2008) , improved long-run outcomes for children (Ananat and Hungerman, 2008 ) and other influences. However, using a new panel of data on state policies related to access to the pill and abortion, Myers (2012) finds that access to abortion had substantial effects on the probabilities of entering into marriage and motherhood. On the other hand, the introduction of the pill and legal changes that granted young unmarried women capacity to consent to it had little if any effect on the average probabilities of marrying and giving birth at a young age. Finally, Pop-Eleches (2006) studies the abortion ban introduced by Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu in 1966 and the impacts of the resulting higher birth rates. Both Ceausescu's Romania and China are communist regimes, and hence they can introduce such dramatic policy restrictions toward individual fertility decisions.
Empirical Strategy
Regression Specifications
In OLS regressions, I will estimate the following equation:
In this equation, i indicates the individual in province s and year t. The variable y represents the number of children he has. SOE, the variable of major interest, indicates if this individual is working in a SOE, X is a set of individual characteristics, including age, age squared, education level, family income level, communist party affiliation and self-reported health, λ s and λ t are province and year fixed effects. An older individual will generally have more children since he is more likely to have finished his lifetime fertility. I add a quadratic term to account for possible nonlinearity in age, for example, the number of children might be smaller for the young people than a simple linear relationship implies. Better educated people may receive less marginal benefit than marginal cost from an extra child, and hence they may have less children than less educated people (Becker, 1960) . These people may also invest more resources on their children, and hence reduce the number of children they can have. Becker et al. (2010) present evidence that such a trade-off existed already in the nineteenth century. The negative relationship between education and fertility is widely documented in different countries (Cleland, 1985) . Basu (2002) review mechanisms that education lead to lower fertility.
More wealthy parents have better ability to raise more children, but they are usually better educated and probably receive less net benefit from children. Most empirical studies provide negative impacts of family income (Borg, 1989) . Communist party members are usually more likely to be in SOEs with a correlation of 0.2 in my sample, so adding the party affiliation can account for its independent impact on fertility. Health conditions may be important in fertility, but the current self-reported health may be not the same as the health conditions when they were in younger childbearing age.
The number of children varies from 0 to 7. The one-child policy might change the timing people give birth. If people can give birth to two or more children, they might give the first birth earlier and give another birth several years later. If they are allowed for having only one child, they might delay the birth and in this way the total fertility rate will be lower as well. This is the reason I also include the sampled individuals with no child. I also consider a setting dropping individuals with no child, and the results are almost the same. Moreover, although the most salient restriction imposed by the policy is restricting individuals having one child to give another birth, the policy also restrict those already having two children to give the third birth. In regressions with a dummy variable for one child or more than one child as the dependent variable, I also find a strong negative impact of working in SOEs on the probability to have more than one child.
Instrumental Variable and Identification
The classic selection problem probably exists in this study, because people working in a SOE is not the same as those not. For example, their preference toward children and risk attitude are probably different. If the individuals with a weaker preference toward children are more likely to choose a job in a SOE, the negative relationship between the number of children and the job type would be spurious. On the other hand, people working in SOEs are more likely to prefer a stable life, and a family with more children might be more important for them. Moreover, it is also possible that people with a higher ability or better political connection are more likely to work in a SOE, while they also have better conditions to raise more children, or can evade the penalty resulting from an extra birth. Therefore, the selection bias can be negative or positive. Especially, since the two types of individuals may be quite different in unobservable or unmeasurable factors, it is not feasible to just include a large set of covariates.
As a preliminary check about which kind of selection biases is dominating, I investigate if there is a smaller desired number of children for never-married men working in a SOE than those working in a non-SOE. There is a special question in this questionnaire: "Without policy restrictions, how many children do you want to have". I can obtain this variable for year 2010 and 2013. I keep those age less than or equal to 30 and obtain 147 observations. These people usually just start their career and will probably marry later, so this gives us a chance to see if individuals with a weaker preference toward children select into SOEs more likely. However, people working in SOEs have a desired number of children of 1.63 on average, larger than 1.47, the number for people working in non-SOEs actually. On the other hand, I compare the number of children for ever-married men working in a SOE with those not for year 2010 and 2013 samples. The average number of children for SOE workers is 0.62, less than 0.65, the number of non-SOE workers. Using the sampled individuals age less than or equal 35 give the similar results. These results imply that positive selection, rather than negative selection, is probably more important, and hence my OLS results probably underestimate the true impacts of working in SOEs. Of course, it should be cautioned that these people are younger and hence are not necessary the same as the older people in some dimensions.
Another problem involves job type switches, i.e. switch from a SOE job to a non-SOE job or the converse. In general, job type switches are not common, especially for those spent most of their careers during the planned economy era, and the first type of swithes is more common than the second type because of the excessive employment in SOEs and the non-competitive nature of China's urban labor market. 
where FSOE is father's SOE status. In the sample with father's SOE status observed, there are only half of observations also containing mother's SOE status. Father is usually the primary earner in his family and has a larger chance to affect his children's career, hence I just use father's SOE status rather than both parents', though regressions keep both parents' SOE status as instrumental variables yield the qualitatively identical results generally.
The excessive employment in SOEs is prominent in China. For example, after 18 years of gradual transition, the SOE share in China's total industrial output had declined from 77.6 percent in 1978 to 28.8 percent in 1996. However, in 1996 SOE's still employed 57.4 percent of urban workers and possessed 52.2 percent of total investment in industrial fixed assets (Lin et al., 1998) . Although a large-scale SOE reform in middle 1990s reduced the SOE share in employment sharply, it is still generally acknowledged that in most SOEs the number of employees is larger than the profit maximization requires. Therefore, it is unusual for an individual to enter a SOE if his first job is not a SOE job. Parents working in SOEs can probably use their connections to assure a job for their children.
Moreover, the use of father's SOE status is based on an institutional feature, which strongly implies that father's SOE status is plausibly exogenous. For a long period till the late 1990s, children were allowed to take their parents' jobs in SOEs one-by-one. For example, if both of the parents are working in SOEs and they have two children, then both of the children can enter the same firms upon their parents' retirement or early retirement. Most people in my sample began their career before 2000, hence this institutional feature is probably relevant for a large share of individuals in my sample.
The major concern about this instrument is that father's SOE status may affect his preference toward children and in turn affect his children's directly, so that the exclusion restriction is violated. To see why the exclusion constraint holds here, the special historical background provides an important clue. Between the 1950s and 1970s, China was a planned economy, and during the 1980s and 1990s, this country experienced a transition to a market economy. During the planned economy era, citizens had little freedom to choose their jobs. The government usually distributed jobs based on its priority and funds availability. Figure 1 shows the distributions of sampled individuals and their fathers' birth years. Almost all the fathers were born before 1965, and hence probably began to work before 1990. This means the selection bias, even if existing for many sampled individuals, is much less likely to be an issue for the group of fathers. In the early 1950s when the communist party began to rule this country, private firms were seized by the government. Since those firms were usually located in coastal areas, people in those areas with many private firms nationalized were more likely to work in SOEs. Between 1953 and 1957 (the period for the "First Five-year Plan"), the government built 156 industrial projects using the Soviet Union's aid, and these projects were almost located in the Northeastern part of this country (Manchuria) and provincial capitals. Not surprisingly, there was a large demand for workers in SOEs during this period, and the government actually introduced a large number of rural labor into SOEs and granted urban residence certificate ("Hukou") to them. 1958-1961 witnessed a decline in the industrial production and then a recovery. Beginning with the so called "Cultural Revolution" in 1966, the industrial production was hit seriously, and a large number of urban graduates were sent down to rural areas, and it was hard for them to find a SOE job even after they came back to the urban areas years later. In the early 1970s, the government also built many industrial projects in the western and southern parts of this country because the northern faced Soviet Union's military threat. It hence can be expected that people in these areas were more likely to find a job in SOEs. In the 1980s, the coastal areas began to experience privatization and introduced foreign capital, and the share of SOE jobs was relatively smaller there. Overall, no evidence shows that the government chooses a group of workers with a special preference toward children. Almost all the fathers probably began their career before 1990, and hence it is not very likely that people with a certain peference toward children start working in SOEs. Starting from 1990s, the government no longer distributed jobs to most people and the effective job markets emerged, then the citizens can choose their jobs much more easily.
Is it possible for the preference toward children to be changed after working in SOEs many years? Especially, it is possible that these fathers have a weaker preference toward children after tolerating the stricter state control in SOEs, and this weaker preference might affect their children's fertility decisions. To check such possibility, I run regressions for the group with age 40 to 60 in my sample with the desired number of children as the dependent variable. The ages for this group are closer to the fathers' in my sampled individuals, and the majority of them have some exposure to the one-child policy during their prime childbearing ages. If their preference toward children was not negatively affected by the policy, it is even less likely for most fathers of the sampled individuals to be affected because they are usually older and have less or no exposure to the one-child policy during their prime childbearing ages. The unconditional regression and the conditional regression with a full set of covariates and fixed effects give coefficients of 0.13 and 0.04, with p-values of 0.03 and 0.49. Therefore, it is hard to say fathers working in SOEs have a weaker preference toward children and probably directly lead to the lower fertility for their children.
Using father's SOE status as the intrumental variable also alleviate the underestimation bias resulting from job type switches. Overall, the fathers are much more likely to spend most of their career in the planned economy era, when the government promised a lifetime job usually. The 2SLS regressions give the estimates for the sampled individuals manipulated by their fathers' SOE status, i.e. those working in a SOE if their fathers did and not working in a SOE if their fathers did not ("complier" group), and hence are free of the bias from job type switches.
The underlying logic is that the current SOE status is related to whether the first job was in a SOE or not, which is in turn related to father's SOE status. Alleviating the underestimation bias from job type switches probably explains why we obtain larger 2SLS results.
Furthermore, I consider two types of robustness check for the validity of the instrumental variable. The strict one-child policy was introduced in 1979. Fathers born in or before 1940 had left their prime childbearing ages when the one-child policy was implemented, and hence they were not very likely to be restricted by this policy and hence their preference was not very likely to be affected because they were working in SOEs. I conduct a robustness check using the sample of individuals whose fathers were born in or before 1940. The magnitude is even larger, and the significance is lower but still significant under the 5% level. There may be still some concerns about the "Wan, Xi, Shao" (later, longer, fewer) policy introduced in early 1970s, however, using the sample of individuals whose fathers were born in or before 1940, I still obtain the similar results. In another check, I add father's age, education level and party member status in robustness check. These variables can account for the influence of fathers on their children not through their children's SOE status. For example, fathers with a higher education level may prefer a lower number of children and affect their children's willing to give birth, while these fathers are probably more likely to work in a SOE. The results remain similar. Finally, core family is nearly as common in urban China as in the Western countries, thus this also limits their parents' impact.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
My main data are obtained from the 2008, 2010 and 2013 samples of the China General Social Survey (CGSS). CGSS is an annual or biannual survey of China's urban and rural households starting from 2003, carried out by the National Survey Research Center, Renmin University of China (NSRC). It is generally considered as a survey with high quality, comparable with the U.S. or Canada's surveys with the same name. Using a multi-stage stratified sampling design, this survey covers all the 31 provincial units in mainland China. The original samples for these three years contain 6000, 11783 and 11438 observations respectively. Compared to the usual datasets in economics, this survey is designed to gather data on social trends and the changing relationship between social structure and quality of life in China. Although the survey was also carried out in several other years, only the three samples contain the major variables used in my study.
I keep the male sample with urban residence certificate ("Hukou") age 18-60, married or once married. Age 60 is the regular age a man can retire and collect retirement benefits. More-over, none of the never-married individuals have children in the dataset, so I do not include them in my sample. My sample contains 1767 observations after dropping those missing the number of children, their own SOE status and their fathers' SOE status or other individual characteristics, including age, education level, family income level, marital status, Ethnic Han, party affiliation and self-reported health.
In China, the relatively loose control over rural residents is based on the residence certificate, while the official one-child restriction is quite rigid across the citizens with urban residence certificate, especially those in the same province. That is, although plenty of rural migrant workers work in urban areas, they are not restricted by the stricter control over fertility since they usually do not have urban residence certificate. I keep the male sample to avoid double counting the impacts of SOE status for a family. Another major reason is that the husband is usually the primary earner in a family, and hence job type should have a larger impact on him. In the appendix, I show the negative impact of SOE status also exists for the female sample, though the magnitude is smaller as expected, and in the OLS regressions husband's SOE status has a much stronger impact than her own SOE status.
The descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 1 9 From Table 1 , we can see that on average, the number of children is 1.09. This perhaps implies a strong impact of the one-child policy. However, the standard deviation of the number of children is 0.58, which means that although the policy may restrict the birth significantly, the restrictions are varying in intensity across the country. Another reason is that many of sampled individuals are still in their prime childbearing ages and hence their current number of children is not equal to their total fertility. Investigating the differences across individuals working in SOEs or not, I find that those working in SOEs have a smaller number of children on average, and interestingly they also have a much smaller standard deviation.
To see if the differences in the number of children are concentrated in a certain group, I plot the average number of children for SOE workers and non-SOE workers for eight birth cohorts (adjusting for sampling years): 1948-1952, 1953-1957, 1958-1962, 1963-1967, 1968-1972, 1973-1977, 1978-1982, 1983-1991 10 . As Figure 2 shows, for all birth cohorts, SOE workers 10 We have three sampling years spanning 5 years, hence the number of children for the same birth cohort in have a smaller average number of children. The gap is smaller for younger cohorts, which is not surprising because they are still in prime childbearing ages. Average number of children 1948/1952 1953/1957 1958/1962 1963/1967 1968/1972 1973/1977 1978/1982 1983+ Birth cohort Non-SOE workers SOE workers Figure 2 : The average number of children for SOE workers and non-SOE workers for eight birth cohorts
The share of individuals working in a SOEs is less than the share of their fathers by 15 percentage points. This difference is large considering father's SOE status asked in the questionnaire is when the individuals were 14 years old, and reflects the privatization of the economy in China. For the individuals born after 1980, many of their parents experienced the large-scale SOE reform and lost their jobs in a SOE in the late 1990s, and the share of their fathers working in a SOE is 55%. For the individuals born in or before 1980, the share is 67%. The ratio of individuals working in SOEs is much larger than the number reported by the National Bureau of Statistics, but this is perhaps not quite surprising. There are 250 million rural migrant workers in urban areas in 2010, generally working in non-SOEs, but very few of them have urban residence certificate, and hence are not the target group of my study. However, they are counted by the National Bureau of Statistics as urban labor.
Although the number of individuals with college education is large, we may remember they are from the urban sample. In China, the college attendance rate in urban areas is much higher than in rural areas. The share of people with primary education is much less than this share for their fathers, while the share of people with college education is much larger than the share for different sampling year is not perfectly comparable without for adjusting sampling years. To adjust for sampling years, I run regressions with the number of children as the dependent variable and SOE status as the explanatory variable, including sampling year fixed effects fo the eight cohorts. I keep the estimated intercept as the average number of children for non-SOE workers, and the difference between the estimated intercept and the coefficient for SOE status as the average number of children for non-SOE workers. their fathers, which is consistent with the general impression of a large-scale advancement in educational attainment in this county. Table 2 presents the OLS results. I find a significantly negative relationship between working in a SOE and the number of children in all settings, and the magnitudes are similar. In the regression with all covariates, I find the average number of children for individuals working in a SOE is 0.09 lower than those not working in a SOE. In other words, if the individuals not working in SOEs came to SOEs, we would probably lose 10 children for each one hundred of them. Concerning the large population size in China, this implies a large impact of privatization. As a remainder, there is a selection issue in job type, and the direction of the selection bias is also ambiguous. The number of children exhibits a strong positive relationship with respect to age, though there is a slight quadratic pattern. This means that an older individual is more likely to have achieved his lifetime fertility. The quadratic term of age is also significant so that the number of children might be smaller for the young people than a simple linear relationship implies. Although it seems natural to think that health condition has effects on fertility, I do not find a significant impact of self-reported health. This is perhaps resulting from the fact that the current health condition does not reflect the real health condition when an individual was giving birth effectively, and the health condition when an individual was giving birth was usually good. Education level and the number of children exhibits a negative relationship, supporting the theory of increasing net marginal cost of children for well-educated people. Party members have a larger number of children, perhaps resulting from better economic conditions or a higher ability to evade policy restrictions, but this estimate is not precise.
Results
OLS Results
2SLS results
The first stage of my 2SLS regressions in Table 3 shows a significantly positive impact of fathers' SOE status on their children's. The F statistic of father's job type in the regression including all covariates and fixed effects is 34.52, much larger than 10, the usual critical value for judging weak instruments (Stock and Yogo, 2005) , and hence supports the validity of my intrumental variable. To address the concern about functional form mispecifications, I also run Probit and Logit regressions. The average marginal effects from these regressions are very similar to those from OLS regressions and are highly significant as well. Because in 2SLS regressions it is not appropriate to use a nonlinear model in the first stage, I do not report the Probit and Logit results for simplicity.
Moreover, older people are more likely to work in SOEs, reflecting the privatization of the economy in last three decades. Party members are more likely to be seen in SOEs as expected. Moreover, although better educated people are more likely to work in SOEs, the impact is not significant. My 2SLS results show a much larger impact of privatization. In the regression with all covariates, I find the average number of children for individuals working in a SOE is 0.42 lower than those not working in a SOE. That is, without considering the selection issue and job type switches, we may underestimate the impact of SOE status by a large amount. Of course, the 2SLS estimates are specific to a "complier" group as usual, and their reaction to SOE status may be not equal to the average person. The magnitudes of other covariates do not change very much compared to OLS results, though the standard errors are larger as usually seen in 2SLS regressions. Hence the same explanations in Section 5.1 apply here.
As explained in Section 3.1, people working in SOEs are more likely to prefer a stable life, and a family with more children might be more important for them. Moreover, it is also possible that people with a higher ability or better political connection are more likely to work in a SOE, while they also have better conditions to raise more children, or can evade the penalty resulting from an extra birth. Although there probably exists negative selection bias as well, this positive selection bias seems dominating, and using father's SOE status as the instrumental variable alleviate these selection biases. Moreover, although the number of job type switches is probably small, this small number of job type switches can probably lead to large underestimation. Overall, the fathers are much more likely to spend most of their career in the planned economy era, when the government ensured a lifetime job usually. The 2SLS regressions give the estimates for the sampled individuals manipulated by their fathers' SOE status, i.e. those working in a SOE if their fathers did and not working in a SOE if their fathers did not ("complier" group), and hence are free of the bias from job type switches. These facts probably explains why we obtain larger 2SLS results. 
Robustness Check
Alternative setting: one child or more than one child To see the probably most salient impact of the one-child policy, i.e. restricting those having one child to give another birth, I define a dummy variable, which is equal to one if an individual has more than one child, and zero if he has only one child. The share of SOE workers having more than one child is 0.13, while this share for non-SOE workers is 0.19. This difference is significant under the 5 percent level.
I replace the number of children with this dummy variable as the dependent variable and run Probit and IV probit regressions. Using Logit and OLS regressions and their IV versions give the similar results. I find a strong negative impact of working in SOEs on the probability to have more than one child, as we can see from the average marginal effects in Table 5 . The results of Probit and IV Probit with a full set of covariates and fixed effects show that compared to those not working in SOEs, people working in SOEs are 5.7 percent and 34.4 percent less likely to have more than one child. The reasons why we obtain larger IV results are similar as before. Probably not surprising, the estimates of other covariates are also almost the same in direction and significance as before. Additional check for the validity of the instrumental variable To address the concern that father's SOE status may affect their preference toward children and in turn affect their children's directly, I consider a robustness check using the sample of individuals whose fathers were born in or before 1940. The strict one-child policy was introduced in 1979. Fathers born in or before 1940 had left their prime childbearing ages when the one-child policy was implemented, and hence they were not very likely to be restricted by this policy and hence their preference was not very likely to be affected because they were working in SOEs. As shown in the first column in Table 6 . The magnitude is even larger, and the significance is lower but still significant under the 5% level.
There may be still some concerns about the "Wan, Xi, Shao" (later, longer, fewer) policy introduced in early 1970s, however, using the sample of individuals whose fathers were born in or before 1940, I still obtain the similar results. Although because of the smaller sample size, the standard error is larger.
More father's variables In a separate robustness check, I add father's age, education level and party member status in 2SLS regressions. As mentioned earlier, these variables can account for the influence of parents on their children not through their children's job type. For example, parents with a higher education level may prefer a lower number of children and affect their children's willing to give birth, while these parents are probably more likely to work in a SOE. As shown in column 3 in Table 6 , the results remain similar. Although it is tempting to include wife's SOE status in the regressions as well, it is unlikely for wife's SOE status to be exogenous. An individual tends to find someone similar to him/her in education level, income level, and social class according to the assortative mating theory. Indeed, their SOE status are highly correlated, with a correlation coefficient of 0.42 in my sample. In addition, I find husband's SOE status has a much stronger impact in the linear regressions for the women sample as shown in the Appendix. The excluded category of self-reported health is fair health, and the excluded category of education is not any education. Standard errors are clustered at province,* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Conclusion
This paper evaluates the role of China's privatization of the economy in weakening the effects of the birth control policy, known as the one-child policy in the West, during the last three decades. Working in a SOE implies more control over individual choices by the government. The baseline OLS regressions show that compared to those not working in a SOE, the number of children for individuals working in a SOE is about 0.1 less on average. In other words, if the individuals not working in SOEs came to SOEs, we would probably lose 10 children for each one hundred of them. To deal with the selection issue, I use father's SOE status as an instrumental variable. The 2SLS results show a much larger difference in the number of children: 0.4. In regressions with a dummy variable for one child or more than one child as the dependent variable, I also find a strong negative impact of working in SOEs on the probability to have more than one child.
My results have a strong policy implication. China's total fertility has been lower than the replacement level for two decades, with a large share of aged population. Although the onechild policy was originally designed to be an one-generation policy (Fong, 2006) , the policy is only relaxed to a mild extent till recently. My results imply that the birth control policy might already lead to an even lower fertility rate in China without privatization of the economy. And since the share of employment in SOEs is already low, the potential of privatization in further weakening the birth control policy is also limited. This implies that a further adjustment or abolition of this policy is needed. Considering China's low fertility rate compared to the world average, it is probably not surprising for the government to encourage giving birth one day. The increased state capacity in SOEs is probably useful in implementing this potential policy.
Appendix: the major results for the female sample 
